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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
FRANCES B. BUNZL, SUZANNE BUNZL ) 
WILNER PATRICIA H. BUNZL and ) 
ANNA R. WILNER, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN, ) 
LLP, BENNETT L. KIGHT, and ROBERT ) 
B. SMITH, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil Action No. 2016cv270084 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Bennett L. Kight's ("Kight") Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the briefs submitted on 
the Motion, the Court finds as follows: 
It is well established that: 
[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes 
that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party 
who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the 
filing party's favor. 
Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73(2008) (quoting Anderson v. Flake, 
267 Ga. 498, 501 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6). "[A] trial court may properly 
consider exhibits attached to and incorporated in the pleadings in considering a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for relief." Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga. 
App. 434, 435 (2005). Defendant seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiffs' claims against him because 
(1) the doctrine of abatement requires a later filed action to be dismissed when the claims arise 
-1- 
out of the same transaction as claims in a previously filed suit with the same parties; (2) the 
claims were not filed within the applicable statute of limitation; and (3) Plaintiffs did not 
adequately allege Kight was acting in his capacity as Plaintiffs' attorney when authorizing the 
transactions that constitute malpractice. 
A. Doctrine of Abatement 
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-5(a) provides in relevant part: "No plaintiff may prosecute two actions in 
the courts at the same time for the same cause of action and against the same party. . .. If two 
such actions are commenced at different times, the pendency of the former shall be a good 
defense to the latter." Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44(a) provides: 
A former recovery or the pendency of a former action for the same cause of action 
between the same parties in the same or any other court having jurisdiction shall be a 
good cause of abatement. However, if the first action is so defective that no recovery can 
possibly be had, the pendency of a former action shall not abate the latter. 
These statutes "are closely related in effect and are to be considered and applied together." Huff 
v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1995); see also Sadi Holdings, LLC v. Lib Props., Ltd., 293 
Ga. App. 23, 24 (2008). "The general rule under O.CG.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and 9-2-44(a) is that 
when there are two lawsuits involving the same cause of action and the same parties that were 
filed at different times but that both remain pending in Georgia courts, the later-filed suit must be 
dismissed." Sadi Holdings, 293 Ga. App. at 24; see Jones v. Rich's, Inc., 81 Ga. App. 841, 845 
(1950). In order for this Code section to be applicable, the parties must occupy the same status 
in both suits. Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 248 Ga. 91, 92 (1981); Tinsley v. Beeler, 134 Ga. App. 
514, 516 (1975). "Whenever a pending suit for the same cause of action has been pled, 
abatement is required as a matter oflaw." Intl. Telecommunications Exchange Corp. v. Mel 
Telecommunications Corp., 214 Ga. App. 416, 417 (1994). "A plea in abatement is one which, 
without disputing the justice of the plaintiffs claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of 
-2- 
asserting it." Hose v. Jason Prop. Mgmt. Co. of Atlanta, 178 Ga. App. 661, 662 (1986) (citations 
omitted). "It is interposed to stop the plaintiff's action, leaving it open to the plaintiff, however, 
to renew the suit in another place or form, or at another time. It should not assume to answer the 
action upon its merits, or deny the existence of the particular cause of action upon which the 
plaintiff relies." Id.; see also Sadi Holdings, LLC, 293 Ga. App. at 26-27 (noting dismissal of 
renewal action was dismissal without prejudice). 
On February 8, 2013, Kight and Lankford filed an action in the Superior Court of Fulton 
County, Bunzl, et al. v. Kight, et al., CAFN 20 13cv227097 ("Bunzl 2013 Action"), seeking the 
court's approval of their accounting of the Bunzl Trusts. In response, the defendants (Plaintiffs 
in this action) filed a Third Party Complaint alleging fifteen counts against Kight and Lankford, 
both individually and as Trustees of the Trusts, which included claims for breach of trust, breach 
of fiduciary duties, accounting, theft, fraud, conspiracy, professional malpractice and negligence, 
among others. 
Lankford resigned as Trustee on May 11,2015, and Kight was removed as Trustee by 
Order dated May 21, 2015. The new general trustees, Patricia, Suzanne and Anna filed a Motion 
to Amend Complaint to realign the parties, to add additional counts, and to add additional 
Defendants. The Court granted this Motion by Order dated December 16, 2015. Now, Frances 
Bunzl, Suzanne Bunzl Wilner, Anna Wilner, and Patricia Bunzl are Plaintiffs in the Bunz12013 
Action and Bennett Kight, William Lankford, Judith Kight, Robert Kight, and several Playmore 
entities are Defendants. Plaintiffs then filed their First Amended and Recast Verified Complaint 
on December 28, 2015, which brought numerous claims against the named Defendants. Notably, 
Count VII, which was brought against Kight for breach of fiduciary duty, alleges that as the 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Kight violated his duty ofloyalty and other fiduciary duties by engaging in 
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acts of bad faith, self-dealing, theft, conversion, fraud and concealment while managing the 
Bunzl Trusts. (First Amended Compl., ~~ 769, 772). The Bunzl 2013 Action is currently 
pending. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs brought four claims against Defendants, both individually 
and collectively, which included claims for legal malpractice, accounting, attorneys' fees and 
punitive damages. Plaintiffs argue these claims are derived from Kight's status as a partner, 
counsel, employee and/or agent of Defendant Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP 
("Sutherland"). Most notably, the claim against Kight individually for legal malpractice is 
prefaced on the claim that he "fail[ ed] to exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence" in his 
capacity as an employee/agent of Defendant Sutherland responsible for managing the Bunzl 
Trusts. (Verified Compl, ~ 356). Plaintiffs set forth specific acts or omissions which they allege 
constitute legal malpractice on behalf of Kight, which include: (1) failing to disclose Kight's 
conflict of interest in representing the family and various trusts; (2) failing to disclose Kight's 
illegal conduct through which he transferred money and assets to himself that belonged to the 
Bunzl Trusts; and (3) Kight's making business decisions and stealing Bunzl assets, among 
others. (Verified Compl. ~354). 
Plaintiffs argue the doctrine of abatement does not apply because Kight does not have the 
same status in both suits. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim in this suit Kight is being sued as an agent 
of Sutherland while in the Bunzl2013Action Kight is being sued in his capacity as Trustee of the 
Bunzl Trusts. Since the Bunz12013 Action does not have claims against Kight in his capacity as 
an employee of Sutherland, Plaintiffs claim the doctrine of abatement cannot apply. However, 
this argument is misguided. Instead, when determining whether the doctrine of abatement 
applies, Georgia courts have considered whether the separate suit that was pending when the 
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present claim was filed involved the same parties, alleged liability on similar theories, and arose 
out of the same transaction at issue in the present claim. See Odion v. Varon, 312 Ga. App. 242, 
244-45 (2011). When determining the status of each party, courts will typically look to whether 
the plaintiffs in the previous action are plaintiffs or defendants in the present action, and vice 
versa. See Tinsley, 134 Ga. App. at 516. 
In both the Bunzl 2013 Action and this case, there are claims against Kight in his 
capacity as an attorney responsible for managing the Bunzl Trusts; it is clear the claims arise out 
of the same transaction or occurrence between the same parties. Plaintiffs in the Bunzl 2013 
Action allege Kight breached his fiduciary duties by engaging in acts of self-dealing, bad faith, 
theft, fraud and concealment through his various acts or omissions in managing the Bunzl Trusts. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs allege Kight committed legal malpractice by failing to exercise 
ordinary care, skill and diligence in his capacity as an attorney managing the Bunzl Trusts. To 
establish legal malpractice, Plaintiffs point to the fact Kight engaged in self-dealing and theft by 
causing money and assets of the Bunzl Trusts to be transferred to him, along with the fact he 
failed to obtain written consent to engage in certain transactions where a conflict of interest 
existed. The breach of fiduciary duty claim against Kight in the Bunzl20l3 Action and the legal 
malpractice claim against Kight in the present case thus arise out of the same transactions or 
occurrences: Kight's alleged mismanagement of the Bunzl Trusts as an attorney. See Griffin v. 
Fowler et al., 260 Ga. App. 443,446 (2003); McMann v. Mockler, 233 Ga. App. 279, 281-282 
(1998) (finding breach of fiduciary duty claim is mere duplication oflegal malpractice claim 
because malpractice claim is based on establishment of a fiduciary, attorney-client relationship 
that is breached). Any minor differences between the two complaints do not controvert the fact 
they both assert claims against Kight that arise out of the same transactions and allege liability 
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based on Kight's role as Plaintiffs' attorney. See Jones, 81 Ga. App. at 846. As such, the 
doctrine of abatement would apply to the claims against Kight in the present case. 
The argument that Kight does not have the same status in the Bunzl 2013 Action as he 
does in this case due to being a counter-defendant in one and a defendant in another has been 
rendered moot since the court realigned the parties in the prior filed case after the briefs in this 
Motion were filed. Further, while additional defendants were added in this suit, the addition of 
new defendants does not prevent the Court from dismissing the claims against Kight under the 
theory of abatement. See McLain Bldg. Materials v. Hicks, 205 Ga. App. 767, 769 (1992). 
Finally, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the Bunzl 2013 Action complaint is so 
defective no recovery can possibly be had pursuant to it, as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-2-44(a) to 
avoid abatement when the doctrine would otherwise apply. Because the claims in this action 
against Kight arise out of the same transaction which the claims against Kight are based on in the 
previously filed and still pending Bunzl 2013 Action, and because Plaintiffs failed to present 
evidence that the Bunzl2013 Action complaint is so defective that recovery cannot possibly be 
had pursuant to it, Kight's Motion to Dismiss the claims against him is GRANTED and the 
claims against him are dismissed without prejudice. 
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 2016. 
~IZ.~~ 
MELVIN K. WESTMORELAND, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Copies to: All registered users of eFileGA associated with this case. 
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Defendants p'laintiJls 
- , - 
Attorneys for Bennett Kight: Attorneys for Francs Bunzl, Anna Wilner, 
Barry J. Armstrong Patricia Bunzl, and Suzanne Bunzl: 
Matthew M. Weiss F. Edwin Hallman, J r. 
Shari L. Klevins Richard A. Wingate 
Mark A. Silver HALLMAN & WINGATE LLC 
Jeff Baxter 166 Anderson Street, S.E. 
Dentons US LLP Suite 210 
303 Peachtree Street, Suite 5300 Marietta, GA 30060 
Atlanta, GA 30308 ehallman@hallmanwingate.com 
(404) 527-4000 rwingate@hallmanwingate.com 
barry.armstrong@dentons.com 
matthew. weiss@dentons.com Anthony C. Lake 
shari .klevens@dentons.com Craig A. Gillen 
mark.sil ver@dentons.com GILLEN WITHERS & LAKE, LLC 
jeff.baxter@dentons.com One Securities Center, Suite 1050 
3490 Piedmont Road NE 
Attornel!, tai: Sutherland Asbill & Brennanz Atlanta, GA 30305 
LLP and Robert B. Smith: aclake@gwllawfirm.com 
Daniel S. Reinhardt cgillen@~llawfinn.com 
Jaime L. Theriot 
Alexandria J. Reyes 
Nicholas H. Howell 
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 
(404)885-3000 
Daniel.reinhardt(w,troutrnansanders. com 
Jaime. theriot@troutmansanders.com 
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